摘要本文基于中小企业融资难的现实问题而引出存货质押融资，并介绍了在国内存货质押融资业务的主要模式。针对存质押融资中因信息不对称和道德风险带来的信用风险问题，分别在银行，物流企业，中小企业，三者间建立两两的博弈模型，首先分析了完全信息静态博弈下银行与物流企业间的博弈关系，利用博弈论相关方法求得银行对物流企业的最优惩罚力度及最优监督力度。其次，对比分析了银行和中小企业在完全信息和不完全信息下进行博弈的均衡差异。并得出结论:银行可以通过减少惩罚所需要付出的成本或者加大惩罚力度来，但力度要掌握好，避免得不偿失；通过博弈分析还可得出，在不完全信息下，要想中小企业选择还款，其要求比在完全信息下更为严格，银行要考虑的因素更为多。64211

毕业论文关键词  存货质押融资；信用风险； 静态博弈；不完全信息

Title   Based on Game Theory Inventory Financing Credit risk management decisions                                                                       

Abstract This article are based on the reality of SME financing problems then leads to inventory financing, and introduced the major inventory financing mode in domestic. Due to the asymmetric information and moral hazard problems caused by credit risk in inventory financing, respectively analysis in bank, logistics enterprises, SMES, established set up two game models between the three. First analyzes the relationship between bank and logistics enterprises under the complete information static game, then use related game theory to obtain the optimal choice. Secondly, we comparative analysis the result between the banks and SMES under the complete information and incomplete information. And concluded: Banks reduce the cost on punish or increase the punishment can achieve the optimal result , but the intensity should be controlled, otherwise it will have more harm than good; Through the game analysis also concluded that in order to let SMES select the repayment, under imperfect information requires are more stringent than under the complete information, so bank need to consider more factors.

Keywords: inventory financing ;credit risk ;static game; imperfect information 

目 录

1引言 1

1.1 研究背景 1

1.2存货质押融资相关研究综述 2

2、存货质押融资业务 5

2.1存货质押融资简介 5

2.1.1存货质押融资业务定义 5

2.1.2 存货质押融资在我国发展状况 6

2.2 我国存货质押融资模式 7

2.3 存货质押融资存在的信用风险 10

3、存货质押融资信用风险管理的博弈模型 12

3.1 银行与物流企业之间的博弈分析 12

3.1.1基于完全信息静态博弈的最优惩罚力度决策模型 13

3.1.2基于完全信息静态博弈的最优监督力度决策模型 16

3.2 银行与贷款的中小企业之间的博弈分析 18

3.2.1完全信息下银行和贷款中小企业的博弈模型 18

3.2.2不完全信息下银行与贷款中小企业博弈的静态模型