摘要：自1978年改革开放以来，我国便走上了急速发展的道路，人民的物质生活水平的不断提高，物价的上涨，无一不体现着我国金融的繁荣，这也对我国银行业的发展起到了极大的促进作用。然而，没有什么花是可以长盛不衰，同样，我们也无法保证银行业永久的蒸蒸日上，自银行业成立以来，虽然有不少的新型银行与金融机构的出现，却也见证了不少银行等金融机构的退出。经济作为一国之本，它的一进一退必然会给人民、社会带来相应的影响，银行的增加必然加大行业的竞争、国家与社会的监管成本，银行的退出也将会扰乱民心，也不利于银行业整体的和谐稳定发展。因此，确立银行市场退出机制，作为一项标准，对银行退出市场的全过程进行把控，并配合实行存款保险制度，使银行退出市场的同时，保险机构能够给予相应的补助，这对存款者的资金也有所保障，然而，存款保险制度的实施并不能完全解决银行退出市场的弊端，也不能完全弥补银行市场退出机制的漏洞，一些难以控制的问题例如道德风险、银行挤兑等现象并不能有效杜绝。所以，根据我国发展的实际情况需要，正确认识银行市场退出机制与存款保险制度的关系非常必要，本文通过国际借鉴与对比分析等方法认为，两种制度之间相互促进相互推动，具有互逆的关系。由于学术水平及分析能力水平有限，本文主要进行了理论分析，辅以相关案例实证对比分析，在相关模型分析上还有所欠缺，仍需要继续深入研究。70324

毕业论文关键词：银行市场退出机制  存款保险制度  道德风险  效应分析

Deposit Insurance System and Banks out of the market mechanism

Abstract: Since the reform and opening up in 1978, China embarked on the road of rapid development, improvement of living standards, rising prices, and both embodies China's financial prosperity, which is also the development of China's banking industry has played a great role in promoting. However, nothing could spend eternity, and similarly, we can not guarantee permanent booming banking sector since the establishment of the banking sector, although there are quite a number of new banks and financial institutions, but also witnessed many banks exit and other financial institutions. The economy, as a country, it is a further retreat is bound to the people, society corresponding impact, increasing the bank is bound to increase competition in the industry, regulatory costs of state and society, the bank will also exit disturb people, It is not conducive to the harmonious and stable development of the banking sector as a whole. Therefore, the establishment of banks out of the market mechanism, as a standard, on the banks out of the market to control the whole process, and with the implementation of the deposit Insurance System, the implementation of the deposit insurance system, so that banks withdraw from the market at the same time, insurance agencies can give appropriate subsidies, which deposits of depositors also be safeguarded, However, the implementation of the deposit insurance system does not completely solve the shortcomings of banks out of the market, it can not fully compensate for the banks out of the market mechanism loopholes, a number of difficult control problems such as moral hazard, bank runs and other phenomena can not be effectively eliminated. Therefore, according to the actual needs of the development of a correct understanding of the bank market exit mechanism and the relationship between the deposit insurance system it is necessary herein by reference and international comparative analysis that the mutual promotion between the two systems with each other to promote, have reciprocal relationship. Due to the limited capacity of academic standards and the level of analysis, this paper analyzed theoretically, supplemented by relevant case empirical comparative analysis on the relationship models are lacking, need to continue in-depth study.