Used in investing activities (4264) (3507) (3965) (2146) (1074)

Provided by financing activities 571 2456 2266 1849 331

Change in cash 1086 177 −59 −86 141

Beginning cash balance 288 111 170 256 115

Cash end of year 1374 288 111 170 256

Several of the changes as well as questionable financial ratios and analytical relationships seem to indicate problems with Enron’s 2000 financial statements long before the firm declared bankruptcy。 Competent statement preparers or users should have asked:

•Why would year 2000 revenues increase 151%, cost of sales increase 172%, yet Enron’s stock price increased only 100%?

•Why did year 2000 show such a large decrease in fourth quarter income, when all prior years showed little fluctuation among quarterly results?

Table 4

Financial statement ratio highlights for Enron corporation

Ratio 2000 1999 1998 1997

EBIT/interest (%) 233。1 122。3 250。5 3。7

Operating income/assets 3。0 2。4 4。7 0。1

Operating income/equity 17。0 8。4 19。6 0。3

Net income/shares ($) 1。30 1。25 2。10 0。33

•Why did revenues increase significantly? Were these increases sustainable? Did Enron “push the envelope” by using highly favorable assumptions or aggressive accounting?

•Why did year 2000 gross margin dollars increase only slightly, when sales increased 151%?

•Why did stock price double in 2000 while the gross margin percentage dropped from

13。3 to 6。6% and earnings per share only increased a nickel?

•Why was Enron’s return-on-capital a paltry 7%, given its market dominance and account- ing methods employed?

•Why did cash flows from operating activities, operating income/equity, earnings per share, gross margins and so many other key ratios fluctuate so greatly from 1997 to 2000?

Moreover, combining the above analysis with an examination of non-financial informa- tion such as the physical movement of goods provides key analytical evidence of possible financial problems。 Analyzing Enron’s 1998–2000 annual reports reveals that from 1998 to 1999 total electricity volumes provided decreased (2。6%) and from 1999 to 2000 total electricity volumes increased 61%。 During these same periods, revenues increased 28。3 and 151。3%, respectively。 Andersen and others should have known that deregulation of the utility industry in many states, especially California, helped to cause huge price increases in the spot price for electricity, natural gas and other utilities。 They and other knowledgeable readers of financial statements should have wondered how long California and other states would allow Enron to maintain the large price increases that generated it windfall increases in revenues。