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H3 has been positively tested. In particular SA should increase the quality of controls since their role should move from a “Descriptive role” of the problems to a “Preventing role”. Even if the recent renewal of Italian Company Law seems to better describe responsibilities and tasks related to the SA role, the coexistence of different auditing roles within the same organisation cancelled possible steps forward for the SA figure introduced by new laws.
The SA who answered this survey declined to comment on this issue since they admitted to being frustrated.
H4 has been negatively tested. The auditors play different roles within a company structure. Moreover this differentiation and the existing difficulty in comparing them with company management on the results of their activity are a clear obstacle that can cause further problems such as lack of communication.
6 .Limitations of the study
The authors are aware of the limits of their survey. First if all, this survey is only part of a larger survey that involves different business industries and sectors.8
The response rate for some auditing roles was very poor. There is always the chance to re-call the sample and to update the initial data.
Another limit is not to have considered the non-traditional Italian systems of management and control.
In fact when the survey was released there was a very limited number of companies adopting the monistic and dualistic models.
The survey could be improved through an update of the systems analysed.
7. Conclusion remarks
The first five sections deal with specific comments about the answers obtained by IA, SA and EA.
The authors believe that the analysis of the connections between Internal Auditors (IA), Statutory Auditors (SA) and External Auditors (EA) is a step forward in understanding and developing a better control system.
As far as the IA function is concerned, Italy is currently going through a “significant evolution” phase, both in terms of its duties and in terms of itsrelationships with other control bodies; hopefully in the future this function should “improve” the work of the “new”role of manager in charge of issuing a company’s accounting and financial reports, actively co-operating with this person.
In terms of the perception of those working within the IA function, the main issues that limit the effectiveness of their actions have been identified, such as: indifference of the Board of Directors towards the IA activity; impediments to the information flow; inappropriate interest connections; personal characteristics; insufficient and non-systematic definition of control procedures and practices; insufficient operational support by other company functions and control bodies.
In order to meet these challenges, more relevant actions aimed at improving the control effectiveness can be summarised, for example: independence protection; appreciation and formalisation of making them responsible for their role; penalty strengthening for incorrect behaviour by process owners and the need for greater information transparency for those subject to checks.
The main issues identified by SA as limiting their control effectiveness are the following: indifference of the Board of Directors towards their activity, personal characteristics, public policies and system factors, impediments to the information flow.
Possible improvements: streamlining auditors’duties; focusing them on the most relevant aspects of control; independence protection; formalisation of their responsibilities and an increase in professional autonomy.
EA identified insufficient internal operation support as one of the issues that could undermine the control effectiveness, besides those related to the indifference of the Board of Directors and the impediments put in place by management.
Strengthening penalties for incorrect behaviour of process owners, managers and other possible auditors, together with streamlining auditors’ duties, are classified as the main and most important improvement actions.