The remaining sections cover cross-checked conclusions. aforementioned supervision bodies and recent law provisions relating to such reporting requirements.
Continuous and active collaboration between the three subjects/bodies studied, managing the related possible role overlaps, is a key step in improving and fixing current critical issues in the area of control.
Secondly, the aspect that is perhaps most striking, again in the general perception of the interviewees, is the indifferent behaviour of the Board of Directors toward the IA and control activity.
For all three bodies interviewed, this is the key issue/impediment for real and effective functioning of the new IC system.
This is being made even more critical, in the case of Internal and External Auditors, by the existence of impediments, put in place by management, to the flow of information that is relevant for the purposes of control.
Such a situation should make us re-consider. The emerging fact is that there is still a presence of management bodies that has not perceived the “positive” value of controls and that maybe find themselves dealing with them, trying to minimise their interference with the management and in terms of activity execution.
This is also valid, however slightly, in the case of SA. From this point of view, it is not surprising that the recent business aggregations, with the related needs to rethink corporate governance structures, tend to implement solutions typical of the
German system, characterised by the presence of a Management Council and a Supervision Council, where the latter certainly appears to be a body equipped with greater powers, operating areas and functions, if compared with the Board of Statutory Auditors.
This survey expresses a recurring issue commonly mentioned by any kind of controlling role: the Italian framework seems to be very poor in terms of “Audit Education”. This lack of culture is clear at various levels within a company (Rebora 2007):
In a listed company:
-mismanagement of the interaction/integration within different control bodies;
-BoD, statutory auditors, external and Internal Auditors should operate according to a unique and shared vision, not with individual and differentiating priorities;
-the introduction of more complex controlling structures within the organisation does not produce better results;
-it is difficult to impose a link between different control roles;
-it is advisable to learn from alternative control systems to update traditional ones (independent auditors committee instead of statutory auditors).
In a non-listed company:
-very poor education;
-serious lack of flexibility and openness to the development of control systems.
The survey finds possible solutions that are based on the role played by the statutory auditor and it stresses various topics that can be the subject of future analysis:
Appendix 1 Journals titles and their main contents
Appendix 1 continued
Appendix 2 Articles regarding IC systems and their failures (period: 2002-2004)
Appendix 2 continued
Appendix 3 Articles about IC and IC failures published by national and international journals (2002-2004)
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