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摘要：随着改革开放的逐步深入，我国的市场经济越来越开放，经济增长速度越来越快。其中，投资是推动经济增长的一个重要因素。由于经济的快速成长，市场经济就产生了“过热”的问题，对于微观层面的企业来讲，就是“过度投资”现象。所谓“过度投资” ，是指接受那些对公司价值而言并非最优的投资机会，尤其是净现值小于零的项目，从而降低资金配置效率的一种低效率投资决策行为。企业的投资结果不会直接影响公司的价值，但是会影响企业的收入和相关成本。因此，企业投资的效率对于企业的整体发展和社会公共资源的合理配置具有十分重要的意义，关系到企业多方面的决策，更关系到国民经济的整体发展。 22580
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本文首先对过度投资行为进行理论概述，然后通过对托宾 Q理论、利益相关者理论、委托代理理论、信息不对称理论对过度投资行为影响的理论基础进行论述。其次，本文通过建立模型，运用实证分析的方法分别对董事长与总经理两权分离情况、董事会规模、独立董事比例、经理层持股以及债权人治理等众多影响过度投资行为的因素进行研究分析，得出各自与过度投资的关联程度。
研究发现，董事长与总经理的两权分离对抑制过度投资行为并没有显著作用。董事会和独立董事制度也不能发挥积极的作用。在我国，经理层持股比例普遍较少，所以并不能有效地发挥其激励作用，对抑制过度投资的效果不明显。而实证分析得出，债权人对抑制企业过度投资积极作用是非常明显的。
关键词： 过度投资；托宾 Q理论；委托代理；信息不对称
The research of corporate investment behavior
based on corporate governance
Abstract: With the gradual deepening of reform and opening up , China's market
economic system more open , faster and faster economic growth . Among them, the
investment is an important factor in promoting economic gain. Due to the rapid growth of
the economy, the market economy has produced a "hot" issue, the micro-level enterprises,
is the " over-investment " phenomenon. The so-called "over-investment" means to accept
the company's value is not optimal in terms of investment opportunities , especially in
project NPV is less than zero , thereby reducing an inefficient capital allocation efficiency
of investment decision-making behavior . Investment companies do not directly affect the
results of the company's value, but it will directly affect revenues and associated costs.
Therefore , the efficiency of business investment overall for the rational allocation of
public resources and social development is of great significance in relation to the various
business decisions , more related to the overall development of the national economy.
Firstly, the over-investment behavior of theory, and then through the Tobin Q
theory, stakeholder theory, agency theory , the theoretical basis of asymmetric
information theory were generated excessive investment behavior are discussed .
Secondly, respectively chairman and general manager of the separation of ownership and
through the establishment of the model , the use of empirical analysis , many factors
influence investment behavior over board size, proportion of independent directors ,
managers , and creditors governance holdings dedicated research and analysis, come to
its respective degree of association with excessive investment.
The results showed that the chairman and general manager of the separation of
ownership on the curb excessive investment behavior and no significant effect. Board of
Directors and the independent director system can not play a positive role. In China, the